France is the only state who always belonged to the core of the world-system and never attained hegemony, nor declined into the semi-periphery. This paper focuses on the reasons for this relatively stable position in the pre-industrial world-syst em. Crucial is France's size and fragm ented regional structure. These constraints prevented Franc e from building on its favourable position at the inception of the world-system. Franc e's development within the world-system was further retarded by the shift in the centre of gravity and mode of transportation of the world-system. This interpla y between general processes, at the level of the entire world-system, and the specific regional structure within France, demonstrates how the general process es of the world-system can be link ed to the specific situation in a given country.
INTRODUCTION
When I started studying sociology in 1978 the world-system approach wa..:; not part of th e regular program. It wa..:; a white spot on the mental map of sociology teachers. Students had to explore individuall y this still new and exiting back.yard of sociology. A cursory glance through some recent introdu ctory textbooks on sociology gives the impression that all this ha..:; changed. Most refer to the concept world-s ystem and summariz e the outline of 
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"WORLD SYSTEM. A social system of global dimensions, linking all societies within a world social order. The world system may most easily be thought of as a 'sin gle global society'. The world system has only come into being since the period of the expansion of the West from about the seventeenth century onwards. Today, howe ver, the existence of an increasingly integrated world system is one of the most important features affecting the lives of most individuals."
It is clear that he gives great importance to the world-system. But Giddens (1989, p. 533) also criticizes W allerstcin for concentrating on economic causes, and thereby negl ecting political, military and cultural factors. Smelser (1994, p. 31) in another and UNESCO sanctioned "authorativc" survey of contemporary sociology claims: "At its most extrem e, world-systems theory would write the internal histories of societies as ramifications of the international economic forces impinging on them ." Smelser (1994, p. 13 l) also writes that Wallcrstcin "carries the idea of the world as an economic system to an extreme, in that the internal dynamics of nations arc seen as overwhelmed by world forces ." Many others -too many to refer to -criticize the world-system approach for a kind of global determinism. It criticized for over generalizing and for paying too little attention to the particular situation in specific countries .
MODE OF EXPLANATION
Before eval uating this criticism of the world-system approach, its general mode of explanation must be discussed. 'Nomcn est omen' is also true for this approach . Th e world-system, especially as used by Wallcrstcin, is a very specific concept, indi cating how [Page 2] Journa I of World-Systems Research explanations in world-syst em theory arc mad e. A world-system is mor e than just a system on a world scale . Systems arc generally define d a.., 'sets of clements standing in interaction' (Von Bcrtalanffy 1980, p. 38) . It seems obvious that interaction betwe en soci eties forms the ba..,is of the worl d-system . This is a necessary but not a suffici ent condition. The character of the interaction is the essential point for Wallcrstcin. The relations must have an essential influence on its constituent soci eties. This means that the relations must have a profound influ enc e on the structure of these soci eties (Wallcrstcin 1974 (Wallcrstcin , pp. 3-ll, 1979 . But what is this structure ? Braudcl's we ll-known division of time in 'l'cvcncmcmticllc', 'le conjoncturcllc' and 'le structur cllc' conta ins the answ er. Braudcl (1972, pp. 13-21) uses the concept of th e short term to describ e the rhythm of the individual. The short term refers to erratic and singular events a..,, for instance, reported in the ma..,s media. The conjuncture, comprising mor e regul ar periodic chang es, is the second unit of time he distinguishes. This medium term consist.., of social cycles, a.., for instanc e the Kondraticff cycle of about 50 years in economic growth.
Braudcl's third uni t of time is the even more cncompa..,sing lon g-term trend . This tr end extends in time beyond the cycles, and may embrace many centuries. Cycles still occur within a structure. The long-term trend refers to the stability and development of that structure. Structure and long-term trend ('le structurcllc') arc closely intertwined. Structure is like the slowly shifting river bed in which the quickl y changing flow of every-day life takes place. In summary: the world-system is a long-lasting system of interaction between societies which has an essential influence on the changes in th e structure of these societies.
The changing relations within the world-system arc the central mode of explanation of the world-system theory. This distinguishes world-system theory from other theories on social development (Menzel 1993 generally seen as going through the same kind of modernization processes. Especially dependency theory is very critical of explanations focusing on forces within a state. Not comparativ e properties but relational properties arc called upon to explain differences in development between states. The main point of dependency theorists' criticism is that the situation in the poor states cannot be understood without referrin g to their exploitation by the rich states. Wallerstcin's world-system theory can, to a certain extent, be viewed as an elaboration of the dependency theory (Bach 1980) . But there are some fundamental differences. First of all, world-system theory gives much more attention to relations between rich states. The objective of dependency theory was not primarily to explain developments of the world as a whole but rather to expose the exploitation of poor stat es by rich ones. This difference in purpose highlights a more fundamental difference between world-s ystem theory and dependency theory. Whereas dependency th eory stresses the importanc e of relations betw een states, world-syst em theory starts with the totality of these relations -the world-s ystem. This is a significant step beyond dependency theory, where social developments in a state arc explain ed through relations with another state. In world-syst em theory, social developm ent in both states is explain ed through their relations with the world-system. This world-system operates accordin g to its own principle s, which cannot be understood by restricting the study to social develop ments in individual states (Bergesen 1980 ). The whole is mor e than the assembled parts ; the world-system has its own dynamic. Structural properties of the world-system are therefore very importan t. The general mode of explanation in the world-system approach is clearly top -down. The way in which the development<; of the world-system influenc e different kinds of stat es is central to this approach. But this docs not mean that those critics of the world-system approach arc right who criticize it for over generalizing and for paying too litt le attention to the particular situation in specific countries. The example of France's pre -industria l development presented below shows how the general processes of the world -system can be linked to the specific situation in a given country. It docs this by exami ning how the forces from the world-system distorted France's regional structur e and blocked her development in the formative (pre-nineteenth century) period of the world -system .
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THE BACKGROUND TO FRANCE'S ST ABLE CORE POSITION
The world-system perspective explains this distinctively stabl e core position of France through the interplay of external forces and internal structur e. Because the world-system is a long-lasting system of interaction between societies, we have to start our examinat ion in the formative period of the world -system. Particularly important for Franc e's context is its position concerning the Mediterranean and Northern European trade circuits. The explanation of France's stable, but subordinate core position in the world-system lies in the int erplay betwee n France's fragmented regional structure with the changing world-s ystem around it. Espec ially the shift northwards of the world -system's centre of gravity disrupted Franc e's regional structure. Source to figure l: ·uroan de-..'!!lopmcnt is a good indicator of regional development. Cities reflect, as the crnssrna,l~ ofboth small-and large-scale interaction, the regions' internal and external capacity for de-..'!!lopmcnt.
We operationalized the economic center of gra-..'ity by again nsingthc data collected by Bairnch ct al.(l98SJ on the location ofa city (in degrees andminn:tcsJ and on the number of people living in that city. With this infonnation it is possible to calculate the center of gravity. This was done by first transfonning the grade data on location into decimal data. In order to get the coordinates of the point in which one can theoretically concentrate all the urban population ofEruopc, the population of each city was first of all multiplied with each spatial coordinate. 'Ihcsc were subsequently snmmcd and then divided by the sum of the population of all cities in Europe. This gi-..'!!s the coordinates of the center of gravity of urban population.
The urban center of gravitywas calculated only for the part offauopc belonging to the world-system at the beginning of the eighteenth ccntt:uy as delimited by Wallcrstcin. This
includes tl1c Briti~h I~lcs. Scm1.di11a,ia. tl1c Low Com1trics. Gcnnm1y. Polm1d. the Baltic cotn1trics, the At~~m,~fha1gariiu Empire, France, and the Iberian and Italian pcnili~nlas.
Tile RlN,ian am\ Ottoman Empire, were acconling to Walkr,tein then oulsid.e Ll1e
Emopean world-,:,,tern (Terlrniw, [985, .
Tile cities were BrawJd (l9'9l locate, tile core ofl11e workl-,:,,tern are al,o ,ilo"wn in till., figme.
Figme l ,how, li1Jl li1e rnban centre of gim ity llil, slliflcd in tile long teirn t,1want, Ll1e norLl1. ln Ll1e fomteenll1 centrny Euwpe's economic cenh-e of gi·a.itywa, pulled toward Venice. where Ll1e circuits of l11e eastern '.\kditenanean long-distance h-ade t,1ud1ed tile Ern<1pean dorsal spine along Ll1e RJline axis p. [24) . Howe.-er. in the ,ixteenLl1 cenlmy. Ll1e position of Venice waned. and Ll1e cenh·e of gi·a.ity ,,,-a, pulled towant, Portugal and Antwerp (Braw.kl [9 7 9, pp. l32-l53J. Around l!.00. Ll1e cenh-e of gimityofl11e workl-,:,,tern in Europe bridlyretrn11ed u, Ll1e ,oull1. when C,enoa held a cenlrnl position in tile Ern<1pean financial , :,,tern. Till., rnle 'wa, ,o disCJ-eel and ,oplll,ticated Lllilt lll.,u,rian, for a long time faikd u, notice it. ' (BrawJd [9>9. p. [57) . but is clearly• isible in Figrn-e l . C,enoa's fragile position wa, later undCJmined by, -mio"' incrn,ion,. in duding Ll1e peneh-ation of Ll1e Dutch in Ll1e bullion flo,,,., between Spanish ArnCJ·ica and Euwpe (Bi-aw.kl l9 7 9. p. l 70). T Ill., conhibuted u, Ll1e demise of l11e '.\kditenanean t1·ad.e circuils and tile rnaun-ation of l11e mod.em workl-,:,,tern. wiLl1 its core located in \:orthwe,te111 Eln<1pe, wilei-e it stayed for tile next ,e.-ei-al cenli.r1ie, -first in Holland and later in England. 
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in Northern Italy prospered because of trade. The emerging world-system increa.:;ed their complementarity and the development of trade along Europe's 'dorsal spine': the overland and river transport route between the Low Countries and Northern Italy. In this 'dorsal spine' the dominant city of Bruges played an important role in connecting the Low Countries with Northern Europe. This Northern circuit wa.:; dominated by the Hanseatic League, which tried to regulate the voluminous but not so profitable trade in Northern Europe. In contra.:;t, the Mediterranean trade conducted by the Northern Italian cities wa.:; much more profitable. Venice in particular connected Northern Italy to the Byzantine Empire and the Islamic world. At that time, those were the most developed area.:; on this side of the globe (Braudcl 1979, pp. 97-111) .
France wa.:; strategically located between these two centres of this European worldsystem. It bordered both the industrial Northern zone and the trade circuits of the Mediterranean. France not only pa.:;sivcly bordered both motors of the world-system, but also played an important active role in integrating this world-system. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Champagne and Brie fairs linked the northern and southern part of the world-system. The money transactions concluded at these fairs enabled th e credit operations of the world-system to function. These fairs declin ed when the French state tried to control these lucrative activities. Besides growing interference by the French state, these fairs suffered from developments to their ea.:;t. Both the openings of mor e ea.:;terly Alpine pa.:;ses and the economic growth of Germany, whos e mines also produced the silver needed by the Italians in their trade with the Levant, undermined the Champagne and Brie fairs . According to Braudel, in the twelfth and thirte enth century France wa.:; -for the first and only time-the centre of the world-system (Braudel 1979, pp. 111-116) . Later, the centre of the world-system made a wide circle around France, from Venice byway of Portugal to Antwerp, Genoa, Amsterdam, London, and New York (See above and especially Figure 1 ).
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Besides its central position in the trad e and financial flows in Europe, France also had a central role in European politics. France border ed on every important European political powe r. This stimulated the early formation of a strong and large state. It also meant that every interstate conflict had direct bearing on France . This central posi tion in the European political arena wa-. sometimes a disadvantage compared to that of more sheltered states. France could hardly, and did not want to, remain neutral in Europ ean conflicts, this strained the state apparatus and bankrupted it (Wallcrstcin 1974 (Wallcrstcin , pp. 170-171, 1989 ).
Although France wa-. unsuccessful in its attempts to dominate the early world-system , it did succeed in creating a strong state controlling a large area. A-. states arc formed against other states (Wallcrstcin 1981 , Tilly 1990 ), the central location of Franc e on the European continent, with powerful neighbours along all its borders, partly explains France's early state formation. But in a way, it was too successful. The size of th e country hampered its economic development (Braudcl 1979 , p. 325, Wallcrstcin 1989 . Sec also : Gottmann 1951 , Fox 1971 , Fierro-Domenech 1986 , de Planhol 1988 . The French state wa-. too big to form an integrated unity. Size caused coordination problems within the state apparatus because of the friction of distance. The French state had great difficulty controlling its large territory. These problem-. were not unique to this country, only more intense than elsewhere. Size in it-.clfwas not so hard to deal with ; the problem wa-. the specific regional differentiation within France: the economically strongest regions had a weak position in French politics. This lack of a regional correlation between economic and political forces hampered the effective nurturing of Franc e's position in the world-system by the French state (Braudel 1979, pp. 339-343) .
The most economically developed regions were located along France's Atlantic coa-.t and its land borders. The political core area lay around Paris. Parisian political interests were often opposite to the economic interests of the rich regions. Therefore,
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Journa I of World-Systems Research these regions did not get enough support from the French state in their competition w ith core regions in the world-system abroad. The orientation of th ese border regions towards the outside world wa-. also a caLL-.c for concern. Their external economic contacts threatened the political integration of France. Inst ead of benefiting from the French state, its economic core often suffered from it. The economically rich regions were taxed disproportionably. In return, they received little or no effective support in their competitiv e struggle on the world market . In France, the interest-. of state and capital diverged (Wallcrstcin 1989, pp. 146-154) . The land-ba-.cd state wa-. unhelpful to the scaba-. cd regions in the West. Also, the capitalists in the poor southern part of Franc e were unhappy with the politi cs of the French state. They want ed free access to the world market and therefore opposed the mcrcantilistic politics of the state. State formation wa-; expensive for both, but neither gained much from it (Wallcrst cin 1974, pp. 268-269) . These smouldering conflic ts of interest frequently flared up a-. open warfare. R egional uprisings were invariably suppressed by the French state, incrca-.ing the rift between France's economic and poli tical core (Wall crstcin 1974, p. 296).
France's economy was not a whole but the sum of separate regional units. Franc e's wealthy regions on its margins were not oriented to the whole of France but to the out-;ide world. They faced the world-system, turning their backs to France. These rich border areas were pulled towards the outside world, and not towards France's centre, each rich town on France's land or sea border influencing only its immediat e countryside. Th ese economic cores were attracted not to a French center, but to the outside world. B esides, these French economic core regions were also connected to different parts of the worldsystem. The southern regions were pulled towards the Mediterranean, the northwestern regions towards the North Sea. Because the pull of these external forces changed with the development of the world-system, the difficulties the French state encountered in holding all its
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regions together only increa-;ed over time (Braudel 1979 , p. 315, 1990 , pp. 672-673, Davis 1973 . The shifting economic centre of gravit y of the world-system tore France's fragile regional economic structure apart. The position of France in the world-s ystem wa-; even more precarious, because the shifting economic centre of gravity coincid ed with changes in the way goods were transported. Franc e held a central position in the world-system at the time of the Champagne fairs, because it wa-; located between the two most dynamic regions: Northern Italy and the Low Countries. France held a strategic position in the land and river routes between these two regions. Trade betwe en Northern Italy and the Low Countries almost had to go through Franc e. But by the beginning of the fourteenth century, France's position wa-; undermin ed by the growing importance of the maritime route between Italy and the Netherlands. Maritime trade between Northern Italy and the Low Countries quite naturall y left Franc e out of th e picture. Because of the shift from land to sea routes, France wa-; starting to be exclud ed from the main capitalist circuit in Europe (Braudel 1979, p. 50) . In the same period, severa l Alpine pa-;ses were constructed or improv ed. Towards the seventeenth century, the technology of sea transport improv ed even further (especially through the development of the 'fluyt'). Moreover, trade in the world-economy becam e bulki er. Grain and timb er, for instance, increa-;ed in importanc e over textiles. Th e dominant trade in the world-system changed from land-ba-;ed luxury goods towards sea-ba-;ed bulk goods.
France's orientation towards the land-ba-;ed luxury trade coincided with a concentration of Franc e's industry on these trad itional luxury products. In this field, Franc e wa-; generally able to compete successfully wi th the English and Dutch. However, this wa-; a victory in the old economy, which wa-; suppl anted by a more pow erfu l econom y ba-;ed on bulk commodities. This concentration of French industri es on luxury products therefore only helpe d in the short run but wa-; detrim ental in the long run (Wallerstein 1974, pp. ,91_,9,)
hance -w11s also sm,ngly '8Jrected by the chllllge from a land-based to a sea-base(l worldsvstem bec8'.l;~e it coincided with the abo",;:-mentioned shift in the economic centre of ~vilynorthwanl~. France's strongp_,sition on the land mutes between North and South mattered less and less. The trade generated by the declining &,nth became less imp_,r tant and relied evermore on ships. These trend~ in regional development arc ilh~~tratedby figure:\. The 'boom' ofBritish to-wns between 1600 and 1800 is dearlyvisible as well as the con tinning stllgnation in most of so·nthern Enrope. The development off rench towns was intermediate and diflcren tiated between stllgnating older cities on il, bonlcrs and shores and developing small cities in the interior. The focns on the Enrnpean continent became an important reason for France's snbonlinate core position when the world-sy~tem CKpanded towanl~ the Americas. llowe",;:r, ·France really had no choke. ·France's location fiXi!d her immediate political interests on tl!e c011tinci1t. France contd not give priority to sea power. as iL, position in the world-system demanded. To ,nn-ive as a state. France had to give priority to il, position in tl!e power struggle on the £1U'O/l(!an continent. To pnt it simply: Frai1cc won the power struggle on tl!e c011tiJ1e11t. hnt lost the struggle at sea. aml thtl~ lost the struggle for c011lrnl of the world-system. Becatl~e Frai1ce lost tl!is more importa11t struggle. it e,-cntttally lost its dmni11a11tposition 011 the continent after tl!e Napoleouic wars (WalleIStein 1974 (WalleIStein . pp. 265-266. 1980 ).
When we compare France with England, the importance of this lack of relations overseas is even more apparent. (Wallcrstcin 1980 (Wallcrstcin , pp. 99-101, 1989 . The lack of resources forced England to develop trading links. France had little immediate need to do the same. Instead, France directed its energy towards unification and internal colonization because of its size. England was forced to exert a greater effort abroad and accordingly developed settler colonies (Wallcrstcin 1980, pp. 103-104) .
This initial English hardship turned out to have beneficial effects in the end. It stimulated English maritime trade, while the internal orientation of the French kept Franc e focused on land transport. This was important because the dominant mode of transport was shifting from land to sea. Besides, it forced England to participate in the international trade network, which in turn stimulated the creation of anti-mcrcantilistic interest groups. In the search for markets, France first developed its own mark. ct and then turn ed toward s the European continent, for which it was topographically and politically very well located. However, in this trade, France relied on obsolete and expensive land transport, while England could use the increasingly cheap sea transport on a world scale (Wallcrstcin 1980 (Wallcrstcin , pp . 85, 103-104, 267-268, 1989 .
CONCLUSION: the changing world-system and France's regional geography This paper explored the reasons behind France's stable core position in the pre-industrial world-system. France's size and :fr agme nted regional structur e prevented Franc e from building on its favorable position at the inception of the world-system. Franc e's development within the world-system was further retarded by changes in the world-system. Shifts in its center of gravity and mode of transportation intensified the problem; already present in France. France's secondary core position in the world-system was explained in terms of the interplay between general processes, at the level of the entire world-system, and the specific regional structure within France.
France's problem lay in forming part of both the northern and southern circuits of the world-system. The shifts in the balance between those two had a severe influence on the country's cohesion. Although the boundaries of economic zones never exactly overlap with political boundaries, the dissonance was particularly glaring for France, compared to the other core states in the sixteenth century. South of Paris via Lyon, France was oriented towards the Mediterranean and was part of an economic zone dominated by the Italians. In the North, along the French maritime front, and in the Rhine region, France was part of the Northern zone. This base structure was very stable over time. This made it very difficult to create a national economy, especially when the economic centre of gravity shifted between these two parts of the world-system. These recurrent shifts changed the relative importance of different regions within France. Several regions may be distinguished in this process. The centre, which was also politically dominant, was the old crossroads on the land routes between the southern and northern part of the earliest world-system. This part of France suffered, at least compared to other European regions, from the shift of the economic centre of gravity and the transition from land to sea transport. Further south towards the French shores of the Mediterranean, the regions were part of the Mediterranean subsystem and underwent the same declining processes leading towards a slide into the scmiperiphery. From the inception of the world-s ystem, northern France was part of the northern core. This region profited from the shift northwards, but suffered somewhat from the shift from land to sea transport. The regions on the west coast of France tried to derive benefit from this shift. Unfortunately, they
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Journal of World-Systems Research received little help from the French state, which wa.., still oriented towards the continent, where the old land-ba..,ed trade network declined and divided by the mcrcantilistic policies of the developing states. The politically peripheral regions therefore lost ground to their competitors abroad (Wallerstein 1974 , pp. 263-266, 295, Braudel 1979 .
France suffered from its own early economic strength. Even until the ninete enth century, the main economic differences between France and England were not in wealth, but in trade. As an clement of a set of states, France's level of economic development wa.., comparable to that of England. Yet a.., an element of the world-system, Franc e had much fewer structural tics with other states. Therefore, while many of their comparative properties were alike, their relational properties differed. Because of the different structural properti es, these comparative properties started to diverge over tim e. England's
